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Abstract
The output of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
has been shown to be discontinuous which can make the
CNN image classifier vulnerable to small well-tuned artifi-
cial perturbations. That is, images modified by adding such
perturbations(i.e. adversarial perturbations) that make lit-
tle difference to human eyes, can completely alter the CNN
classification results. In this paper, we propose a practical
attack using differential evolution(DE) for generating effec-
tive adversarial perturbations. We comprehensively evalu-
ate the effectiveness of different types of DEs for conduct-
ing the attack on different network structures. The pro-
posed method is a black-box attack which only requires the
miracle feedback of the target CNN systems. The results
show that under strict constraints which simultaneously
control the number of pixels changed and overall perturba-
tion strength, attacking can achieve 72.29%, 78.24% and
61.28% non-targeted attack success rates, with 88.68%,
99.85% and 73.07% confidence on average, on three com-
mon types of CNNs. The attack only requires modifying 5
pixels with 20.44, 14.76 and 22.98 pixel values distortion.
Thus, the result shows that the current DNNs are also vul-
nerable to such simpler black-box attacks even under very
limited attack conditions.
1. Introduction
Recent research has shown that Deep Convolutional
Neural Network(CNN) can achieve human-competitive ac-
curacy on various image recognition tasks [25]. How-
ever, several recent studies have suggested that the map-
ping learned by CNN from input image data to the out-
put classification results, is not continuous. That is, there
are some specific data points (or possibly some continuous
regions) in the input space whose classification labels can
be changed by adding even very small perturbations. Such
modification is called “adversarial perturbation” in the case
that potential adversaries wish to abuse such a characteris-
tic of CNN to make it misclassify[18, 11, 24, 7]. By using
Figure 1. The proposed few-pixel attack that successfully fooled
three types of DNNs trained on CIFAR-10 dataset: The All convo-
lutional network(AllConv), Network in network(NiN) and VGG.
The original class labels are in black color while the target class
labels are in blue.
various optimization methods, tiny well-tuned additive per-
turbations which are expected to be imperceptible to human
eyes but be able to alter the classification results drastically,
can be calculated effectively. In specific, adding the ad-
versarial perturbation can lead the target CNN classifier to
either a specific or arbitrary class, both are different from
the true class.
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In this research, we propose and evaluate a black-box
method of generating adversarial perturbation based on dif-
ferential evolution, a natural inspired method which makes
no assumptions about the problem being optimized and can
effectively search very wide area of solution space. Our pro-
posal has mainly the following contribution and advantages
compared to previous works:
• Effectiveness - With the best parameter setting of
DE and extremely limited conditions, the attack can
achieve 72.29%, 78.24% and 61.28% success rates
of conducting non-targeted attacks on three types of
common convolutional neural network structures: Net-
work in Network, All convolutional Network and
VGG16[21] trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. Further re-
sults on ImageNet dataset show that non-targeted at-
tacking the BVLC AlexNet model can alter the labels
of 31.87% of the validation images.
• Black-Box Attack - The proposed attack only needs
miracle reaction (probability labels) from the target
CNN system while many previous attacks requires ac-
cess to the inner information such as gradients, net-
work structures, training data and so on, which in most
cases is hard or even not available in practice. The
capability of being able to conduct black-box attack
using DE is based on the fact that it makes no assump-
tion on the optimization problem of finding effective
perturbation such that does not abstract the problem to
any explicit target functions according to the assump-
tion, but works directly on increasing(decreasing) the
probability label values of the target(true) classes.
• Efficiency - Many previous attacks of creating adver-
sarial perturbation require alternation on a consider-
able amount of pixels such that it may risk the possi-
bility being perceptible to human recognition systems
as well as require higher cost of conducting the modi-
fication (i.e. the more pixels that need to be modified,
the higher the cost). The proposed attack only requires
modification on 5 pixels with an average distortion of
19.39 pixel value per channel. Specifically, the mod-
ification on 5 pixels is further pressured by adding a
term that is proportional to the strength of accumulated
modification in the fitness functions of DEs.
• Scalability - Being able to attack more types of CNNs
(e.g. networks that are not differentiable or when the
gradient calculation is difficult) as long as the feedback
of the target systems is available.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces
previous attack methods and their features, as well as com-
pares with the proposed method. Section 3 describes why
Figure 2. A comparison between the adversarial images generated
by proposed attack and one-pixel attack. Since the former has con-
trol mechanisms embedded in the fitness function, the distortion it
caused is expected to be less perceptible than one-pixel attack. As
can be seen, even if requiring perturbing more pixels, the proposed
attack can have similar or better visual effect to one-pixel attack in
practice which only few or even none of the perturbed pixels are
noticeable.
and how to use DE to generate effective adversarial pertur-
bation under various settings. In Section 4, several mea-
sures are proposed for evaluating the effectiveness of DE
based attack. Section 5 discusses the experimental results
and points out possible future extension.
2. Related works
Though CNN has given outstanding performance of clas-
sification in different practical domains, its security prob-
lem has been also emphasized[2] [1]. For example, in the
domain of natural language processing, the CNN-based text
classification can be easily fooled by purposely adding or
replacing specific words or letters [31]. For speech-to-text
recognition, the signal can be also altered by adding a tiny
additional signal such that the resulting text can be very dif-
ferent from the origin [33]. The CNN-based image recogni-
tion suffers the same problem. In fact, the intriguing(or vul-
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nerable) characteristic that CNN is sensitive to well-tuned
artificial perturbation was first reported by evaluating the
continuity of CNN output with respect to small change on
input image [24]. Accordingly various optimization ap-
proaches are utilized for generating effective perturbation
to attack the CNN image classifiers. I.J.Goodfellow et al.
proposed “fast gradient sign” algorithm for calculating ef-
fective perturbation based on a hypothesis in which the lin-
earity and high-dimensions of inputs are the main reason
that a broad class of networks are sensitive to small per-
turbation [11]. S.M. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed a
greedy perturbation searching method by assuming the lin-
earity of CNN decision boundaries [7]. N. Papernot et al.
utilize Jacobian matrix with respect to the network to build
“Adversarial Saliency Map” which indicates the effective-
ness of conducting a fixed length perturbation through the
direction of each axis [18, 20]. Based on these preliminary
works, attacks in extreme conditions are also proposed to
show the vulnerability of CNN is even more serious. One
pixel attack shows that one bad pixel can be able to alter
the entire classification output [32]. Unlike common image-
specific perturbations, the universal adversarial perturbation
is a single constant perturbation that can fool a large amount
of images at the same time [14].
To the best of our knowledge, the one-pixel attack is the
only existing work which implemented DE for finding opti-
mized adversarial perturbation[32]. The work shows that
DE can generate effective solution even under very lim-
ited condition(i.e. only one-pixel can be modified). How-
ever, the one-pixel attack only aims to show the possibil-
ity of conducting the attack with DE and implements one
kind of simple DE with a constant F value as 0.5 and no
crossover, which leaves the problem of evaluating and com-
paring other kinds of different DE variants. The proposed
few-pixel attack indeed modifies more pixels than one-pixel
attack. However, it does not mean that few-pixel attack re-
quires more access to the target image since even for the
one-pixel attack, it is also necessary to access to all pix-
els of the image to find the best pixel to perturb. In addi-
tion, one-pixel attack does not fully consider the constraints
in practice, for example there is no terms for controlling
the distortion of pixels in the fitness function used by one-
pixel attack. On the other side, the proposed few-pixel at-
tack still requires modification on less pixels compared to
most previous works. Furthermore, in this research we fo-
cus on non-targeted attacks while one-pixel attack is based
on targeted-attack. Due to the significant difference on suc-
cessful rate of attack and other factors such as time and re-
source consumption, the simpler non-targeted attack can be
more practical, especially in the case of large-scale attack.
A comparison between the proposed and one-pixel attack
showing the difference on methodologies is summarized by
Figure. 3 (See Section 4 for the detail description). Other
Figure 3. A comparison between the proposed attack and one-pixel
attack showing the difference on parameter settings.
black-box attacks that require no internal knowledge about
the target systems such as gradients, have also been pro-
posed. N. Papernot et al. proposed the first black-box at-
tack against CNN which consists in training a local model
to substitute for the target CNN, using inputs synthetically
generated by an adversary and labeled by the target CNN.
The local duplication is then used for crafting adversarial
examples which are found being successfully misclassified
by the targeted CNN [5]. N. Narodytska et al, implemented
a greedy local-search to perturb a small set of pixels of an
image which treats the target CNN as a miracle [17].
3. Methodology
3.1. Problem Description
Calculating adversarial perturbation added to a natural
image for confusing CNN classification can be abstracted as
an optimization problem with constraints. Assuming that a
2-d three-channel RGB image can be represented by a flat-
tened n-dimensional vector in which each scalar element
represents a tuple consisting of three channel values of a
pixel. Let f be the target image classifier which receives
n-dimensional inputs, x = (x1, .., xn) be the original natu-
ral image classified with predicted label cp according to f .
Note that cp might not be the ground true of x since f can
also misclassify without any outside interfering. The soft la-
bel (i.e. probability) of sample x being with label cp is rep-
resented as fcp(x). A vector e(x) = (e1, .., en) which has
the same dimensions to x represents a specific additive per-
turbation with respect to a specific natural image x, which is
being able to alter the label of x from cp to the target class
tadv where cp 6= tadv with the modification strength less
than maximum modification limitation L, which for exam-
ple can be measured by the length of vector e(x) (e.g. the
accumulated pixel values modified) or the number of none-
zero elements of e(x) (i.e. the number of pixels modified).
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Therefore the ultimate goal of adversaries is to find the opti-
mized solution e(x)∗ for the following question. In the case
of targeted attack, the target class tadv is designated while
for non-targeted attack, it can be an arbitrary class as long
as tadv 6= cp.
maximize
e(x)∗
ftadv (x + e(x))
subject to ‖e(x)‖ ≤ L
In the case of this research, the maximum modification
limitation L is set to be two empirical constraints: 1) The
number of pixels can be modified, which is represented by
d, is set to be 5 while the specific index of each modified
pixel is not fixed. The constraint can be represented as
‖e(x)‖0 ≤ d where d = 5. Except the elements need to
modify, others in vector e(x) are left to zero. 2) The fitness
functions of DE utilized in this research favor the modi-
fication with smaller accumulated pixel values more than
success rate of attack such that controlling the accumulated
pixel values becomes the priority during the evolution. Such
constraints are more restricted compared to many previous
works which only implement restrctions similar to either 1)
or 2) [14, 8].
Geometrically, the entire input space of a CNN image
classifier can be seen as a n-dimensional cube such tat
the proposed attacks that modifies 5 pixels are essentially
searching the effective perturbation on the 5-dimensional
slices of input space where 5 ≤ d, which the size of the
slice is further limited by constraints on distortion imple-
mented in the fitness function. In other words, the search
of each iteration of DE is limited to towards 5 directions
also with limited length of steps which each direction is per-
pendicular to a certain axes of the input space coordinate.
However, the probe can still logically find an arbitrary data-
point in the input space by using multiple iterations. Even if
in each iteration, the search directions and area of the pro-
posed attack are limited, it can still probe the entire input
space towards arbitrary 3-d direction to find better optima
by iterating the progress. This is illustrated in Figure for
the case when n = 3 and d = 2.
3.2. Perturbation Strength
In this research, a five-pixel modification is choose as the
strength of attack by considering the practicability of the at-
tack. First, few-pixel modification is more efficiency than
global perturbation [14] that modifies each or most pixels
of an image due to less variables need to solve. On the
other side, one-pixel attack numerically requires the least
cost [32]. However, the one-pixel attack can be hard imper-
ceptible in practice since all attack strength concentrates on
the single modified pixel. By adding the number of pixels
that can modify, the strength can be distributed to make the
modification less visible. In practice, a scenario that one-
Figure 4. An illustration of conducting two-pixel perturbation at-
tack in a 3-dimensional input space coordinate(i.e. the image has
three pixels). The original natural image is a data point repre-
sented by S1. Due to the limitation on the number of dimensions
that can be probed, in each iteration the search is only allowed on
a 2-d plane (shown by green, blue and orange planes in the figure)
around the current solution. As shown, after three iterations which
the direction of probe is shown by yellow arrows, it finds the op-
timal point. By iterating the evolution of DE, the 2-d probe can
actually move in towards arbitrary directions in 3-d space to find
the optima.
pixel attack is available but five-pixel attack is not common.
A visual comparison of the proposed five-pixel attack and
one-pixel attack is illustrated by Figure. 2.
3.3. Differential Evolution and Its Variants
Differential evolution (DE) is currently one of the most
effective stochastic real-parameter optimization method for
solving complex multi-modal optimization problems [23],
[6]. Similar to Genetic algorithms and other evolutionary
algorithms, DE acts as a black-box probe which does not
care the specific form of the target functions. Thus, it can
be utilized on a wider range of optimization problems (e.g,
non-differentiable, dynamic, noisy, among others). DE uses
iterative progress for improving the quality of the popula-
tion which each individual in the population, which is al-
ways called genome, is a potential solution for the corre-
sponding target problem. In particular, DE considers dif-
ference of the individual genomes as search ranges within
each iteration to explore the solution space. In addition, DE
uses one-to-one selection holds only between an ancestor
and its offspring which is generated through mutation and
recombination, rather than the commonly used tournament
selection in many other evolutionary algorithms. Such a se-
lection strategy has a superior ability to preserve population
diversity better than tournament selection where elites and
their offspring may dominate the population after few itera-
tions. [4].
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Different DE variants mainly demarcate from others on
the ways of conducting mutation and crossover. We specifi-
cally introduce how to combine different strategies of muta-
tion and crossover for implementing various kinds of DEs.
The specific settings of DEs implemented in this research
are summarized by Table 4 and Table 5.
3.3.1 Mutation
In the biological point of view as well as genetic algorithms
inspired, the mutation is a random change on an individual
xi of the population in order to gain higher diversity through
iterations. Being different from genetic algorithms, which
directly conduct random change of values on xi, one of the
most basic mutation strategies is to randomly choose three
other individuals, indexed by r1, r2 and r3 from the current
population, and combine them with a scale parameter F to
form the mutated xi, denoted by xi∗. Specifically, the xi∗
is obtained from the following formula:
xi
∗ = xr1 + F (xr2 + xr3),
r1 6= r2 6= r3,
where F is the scale parameter set to be in the range from
0 to 1. It can be seen that under such a scheme, the mutated
xi
∗ has no relationship with its prototype xi. Their relations
can be established in the crossover step.
The intuition of such a mutation is using the individual
xr1 as the basis, plus the difference (scaled by the factor F )
between another two individuals xr2 and xr3 to generate
child. Such difference indicates a meaningful step in the
search space. It is actually the different values of parameter
F demarcates from one mutation to another. Instead of a
constant F , it can be also set to be random and to be specific
for each individual in a certain iteration. In this research,
we respectively adopt different F to evaluate the influence
to the attack success rates.
3.3.2 Crossover
The crossover step after mutation, concerns about combin-
ing the original individual xi and its corresponding child
xi
∗. This is the step that xi and xi∗ actually establish
the connection to each other, which is used for improv-
ing the potential diversity of the population. Specifically,
the crossover exchanges the components of xi∗ obtained by
mutation step, with the corresponding elements of its pro-
totype xi, by using two kinds of crossover strategies: expo-
nential crossover and binomial crossover.
Simply put, the exponential crossover replaces a series
of elements of xi∗, saying any elements without the range
from index i to j, with the elements of xi that own the same
index, where 1 6 i 6 j 6 D whereD is the size of an indi-
vidual. On the other hand, binomial crossover replaces ev-
ery element of xi∗ according to a probability of crossover,
denoted by Cr. Specifically, a random number within the
range from 0 to 1 is generated for each element in xi∗, re-
place with the corresponding value of xi if it is smaller than
Cr.
Each individual (genome) of DE holds the information of
one five-pixel attack (perturbation). That is, each individual
represents a series of perturbation on five pixels, which the
information of each pixel perturbation includes its x-y co-
ordinate position and RGB value. Hence an individual is
encoded in a 5X5 array.
Simply put, one single perturbation consists of its loca-
tion of conducting perturbation and specific values of per-
turbation. We consider an approach by combining expo-
nential and binomial crossover such that the new crossovers
probabilistically exchange these two types of information
between a currently individual and its offspring. Specifi-
cally, we consider the following 4 types of crossovers:
• Crossover on position information. The crossover
only replaces the position information (i.e. the first
two dimensions) of xi∗ with the one owned by xi. A
probability value Cp is used to identify if the crossover
triggers or not. Exchanging information of coordinate
is for letting the offspring inherits the location infor-
mation of vulnerable pixels containing in current pop-
ulation.
• Crossover on RGB values. The crossover only re-
places the RGB value information (i.e. the last three
dimensions) of xi∗ with the one owned by xi. A prob-
ability value Crgb is used to identify if the crossover
triggers or not. Exchanging information of coordinate
is for letting the offspring inherits the information of
vulnerable RGB perturbation values containing in cur-
rent population.
• Crossover for both position and RGB values. Such a
crossover is the combination of the above two, accord-
ing to the assumption that both crossovers are useful.
• No crossover. The opposite to the one above, assum-
ing that exchanging either information of pixel loca-
tions or RGB values is not meaningful.
3.3.3 Selection
The selection step implemented by this research makes no
difference to the standard DE selection setting. Specif-
ically, unlike the tournament selection in Genetic Algo-
rithms which ranks all population based on the individual
fitness and selects amount of best individuals, DE uses a
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one-to-one selection holds only competitions between a cur-
rent individual xi and its offspring x∗i which is generated
through mutation and crossover. This ensures that DE re-
tains the very best so-far solution at each index therefore
the diversity can be well preserved.
3.3.4 Other DE variants
It is worth to mention that even if different variants of DE
have been implemented and evaluated in this research, there
are actually even more complex variations/improvements
such as self-adaptive [3], multi-objective [27], among oth-
ers, which can potentially further improve the effectiveness
of attack.
3.4. Using Differential Evolution for Generating
Adversarial Perturbation
The use of DE for generating adversarial images have the
following main advantages:
• Higher probability of Finding Global Optima - DE
is a meta-heuristic which is relatively less subject to lo-
cal minima than gradient descent or greedy search al-
gorithms (this is in part due to diversity keeping mech-
anisms and the use of a set of candidate solutions). Ca-
pability of finding better solutions (e.g. global optima
rather than local) is necessary in our case since we have
implemented more restricted constraints on perturba-
tion in this research such that the quality of optimiza-
tion solution has to be guaranteed to a high extent.
• Require Less Information from Target System - DE
does not require the optimization problem to be differ-
entiable as is required by classical optimization meth-
ods such as gradient descent and quasi-newton meth-
ods. This is critical in the case of generating adver-
sarial images since 1) There are networks that are not
differentiable, for instance [26]. 2) Calculating gradi-
ent requires much more information about the target
system which can be hardly realistic in many cases.
• Simplicity - The approach proposed here is indepen-
dent of the classifier used. For the attack to take place
it is sufficient to know the probability labels. In ad-
dition, most of previous works abstract the problem
of searching the effective perturbation to specific opti-
mization problem (e.g. an explicit target function with
constraints). Namely additional assumptions are made
to the searching problem and this might induce addi-
tional complexity. Using DE does not solve any ex-
plicit target functions but directly works with the prob-
ability label value of the target classes.
3.5. Method and Settings
The DE is used to find the best perturbation which can
achieve high probability label of target class and low mod-
ification strength. The information of a proposed five-pixel
perturbation (which is one individual of the DE population)
is encoded into an five-dimensional array which each di-
mension contains five elements: x-y coordinates and RGB
value of one-pixel perturbation. The initial number of pop-
ulation is 400 and during each iteration another 400 candi-
date solutions (children) will be produced by various types
of mutation and crossover. Then a 400 knock-out selection
is conducted between each pair of individual and its off-
spring, to produce the new population with the same size to
the last generation. The fitness function used is as follows:
F (xi) = 0.25Pt(xi) + 0.75C(xi),
C(xi) = (R(xi) +G(xi) +B(xi))/256,
where F (xi) is the fitness value of an individual xi,
which is a combination of its probability value belonging
to the true class t, Pt(xi), and the cost of attack C(xi).
Weight values of 0.25 and 0.75 are respectively assigned to
the two terms. We find that a higher weight value assigned
to Pt(xi) will make the DE evolution take much less care
of C(xi) such that the cost of attack increases drastically.
While doing the opposite will increase Pt(xi) but less sig-
nificantly. Such weights indicate that obtaining a xi with
low Pt(xi) is much easier than a xi with low C(xi). The
cost C(xi) is measured as average pixel value changed on
each pixel modified, which is expected to be small to guar-
antee the modification can be invisible. For an individual,
the lower the fitness, the better the quality hence easier the
survival.
The maximum number of generation is set to 100 and
early-stop criteria can be triggered when there is at least one
individual in the population whose fitness is less than 0.007.
Once stopped, the label of true class is compared with the
highest non-true class to evaluate if the attack succeeded.
The initial population is initialized by using uniform distri-
butions U(1, 32) for CIFAR-10 images for generating x-y
coordinate (e.g. the image has a size of 32X32 in CIFAR-
10) and Gaussian distributions N (µ=128, σ=127) for RGB
values. For ImageNet the setting is similar.
3.6. Finding the Best Variant
In order to find the best DE variant for generating adver-
sarial samples, we propose a greedy-search method which
starts from a DE variant with basic setting. Then we gradu-
ally alter the parameter settings to evaluate the effect on the
success rate of attack and come up with a local-optimized
setting, which is further used for attack under several differ-
ent scenarios. Specifically, it is mainly the mutation and
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crossover that differ different types of DE variants. We
implement a basic DE which enables both mutation and
crossover to middle levels. Then we adjust the value of each
single parameter while keep others unchanged to conduct
the test.
For example, the four types of crossover proposed in
Section 3.3.2, can be achieved by adjusting the correspond-
ing crossover probability Cp and Crgb. For instance, both
Cp and Crgb are set to be a very small number means to
disable the crossover.
4. Evaluation and Results
The following measures are utilized for evaluating the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed attack:
• Success Rate - It is defined as the empirical probabil-
ity of a natural image that can be successfully altered
to another pre-defined (targeted attack) and arbitrary
class (non-targeted attack) by adding the perturbation.
• Confidence - The measure indicates the average prob-
ability label of the target class output from the target
system when successfully altered the label of the im-
age from true to target.
• Average distortion
The average distortion on the single pixel attacked
by taking the average modification on the three color
channels, is used for evaluating the cost of attack.
Specifically, the cost is high if the value of average
distortion is high such that it is more likely to be per-
ceptible to human eyes.
4.1. Comparison of DE variants and Further Ex-
periments
Preliminary experiments are for evaluating different DEs
(i.e. different F value and crossover strategies). We utilize a
greedy search approach to find the local-optimized DE vari-
ant. Specifically, we first propose a standard model which
enables all settings to mid levels. Then the settings are grad-
ually changed one-by-one for evaluating the influence to the
effectiveness of attack. The local-optimized model is found
for conducting further experiments with more datasets and
network structures.
Specifically, the comparison of DE variants are con-
ducted on the All convolution network [22] by launch-
ing non-targeted attacks against them for finding a local-
optimized model. The local-optimized model is fur-
ther evaluated on Network in Network[13] and VGG16
network[21] trained on Cifar-10 dataset [12]. At last,
the model is applied for non-targeted attacking the BVLC
AlexNet network trained on ImageNet dataset with the same
DE paramater settings used on the CIFAR-10 dataset, al-
though ImageNet has a search space 50 times larger than
CIFAR-10, to evaluate the generalization of the proposed
attack to large images. Given the time constraints, we con-
duct the experiment without proportionally increasing the
number of evaluations, i.e. we keep the same number of
evaluations.
The structures of the networks are described by Table 1,
2 and 3. The network setting were kept as similar as pos-
sible to the original with a few modifications in order to
achieve the highest classification accuracy. All of them are
with ReLu activation functions. For each of the attacks on
the three types of Cifar-10 neural networks 500 natural im-
age samples are randomly selected from the test dataset to
conduct the attack. For BVLC AlexNet we use 250 samples
from ILSVRC 2012 validation set selected randomly for the
attack.
4.2. Results
The success rates, confidence and perturbation strength
for the attack using different DE variants on All convo-
lutional network is shown by Table 4 and Table 5. Then
local-optimized DEs are selected to conduct further exper-
iments on three additional types of networks: Network in
Network (NIN), VGG16 network and AlexNet BVLC net-
work. The first two are trained on Cifar-10 dataset and the
latter is based on ImageNet dataset. The results are shown
by Table 6.
Each type of DE variant is abbreviated in the format
“Fvalue/Cp/Crgb”. For example, 0.5/0.5/0.5 denotes the
model with its F value, crossover rate of coordinate and
RGB value all equal to 0.5. We choose the 0.5/0.5/0.5 as
the standard prototype model to compare with other vari-
ants, since it enables all settings to a mid extent.
4.2.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Attack.
First the influence of changing F value is evaluated by im-
plementing the standard model with different F values. Ac-
cording to the results of first 4 rows in Table 4, higher F
values give very limited increase on success rate of attack
however require a considerable amount of more distortion.
For example, shifting from 0.1/0.5/0.5 to 0.9/0.5/0.5 in-
creases only 1.37% success rate with a cost of increasing
5.39(26.53%) pixel value. Since the F controls how far the
distance starting from the current individuals to probe new
solutions, the intuition of this result indicates that moving
smaller steps in the solution space might find new solutions
that are similar to the prototypes, with comparative attack
success rate but more efficient, while moving larger steps
may find totally different solutions with higher distortion
required. This might indicate that in the solution space, the
candidate solutions (vulnerable pixels) are gathered within
several groups and moving by small steps from the existing
solutions can find new individuals with better quality(i.e.
7
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=96)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
dropout(0.3)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 2, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=10)
average pooling layer(kernel=6, stride=1)
flatten layer
softmax classifier
Table 1. All convolution network
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=160)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=96)
max pooling layer(kernel=3, stride=2)
dropout(0.5)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=5, stride = 1, depth=192)
average pooling layer(kernel=3, stride=2)
dropout(0.5)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=192)
conv2d layer(kernel=1, stride = 1, depth=10)
flatten layer
softmax classifier
Table 2. Network in Network
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=64)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=64)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=128)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=128)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=256)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
conv2d layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=512)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
flatten layer
fully connected(size=2048)
fully connected(size=2048)
softmax classifier
Table 3. VGG16 network
require less distortion). Therefore it comes to a conclusion
that smaller F values can effectively decrease the distortion
needed for the attack.
Then we keep the F value as 0.5 for conducting further
experiments of comparing influence of two crossover strate-
gies. The results show that generally both types of crossover
are not helpful for improving success rate and decreasing
distortion required. For example, comparing 0.5/0.1/0.1
which disables both crossovers, and 0.5/0.1/0.9(0.5/0.9/0.1)
which only enables one crossover, shows 1.25%(0.23%) re-
duction on success rate and only 0.04(0.48) decrease on dis-
tortion. Enabling both crossovers (0.5/0.9/0.9) is also not
helpful in a similar way. Such results show that the qual-
ity of perturbation can not be significantly improved by re-
placing the coordinate or RGB color information of children
population with their corresponding ancestors’.
According to the results of comparison, we choose the
0.5/0.1/0.1 and 0.1/0.1/0.1 as the two local-optimized mod-
els for conducting further experiments. Note that as men-
tioned above, setting a smaller F value can be helpful for de-
creasing the distortion on perturbed pixels. On CIFAR-10,
the success rates of proposed attacks on three types of net-
works show the generalized effectiveness of the proposed
attack through different network structures. Specifically,
the Network in Network structure shows the greatest vul-
nerability which gives highest success rate, confidence and
least distortion under the same settings of DE. The VGG16
network on the other side, shows the average highest ro-
bustness. Attacking the All convolutional network compar-
atively requires the most distortion and gives mid perfor-
mance. In addition, a smaller F value is effective for reduc-
ing distortion through different network structures.
On ImageNet, the results show that the proposed attack
can be generalized to large size images and fool the cor-
responding larger neural network. Note that the ImageNet
results are done with the same settings as CIFAR-10 while
the resolution of images we use for the ImageNet test is
227x227, which is 50 times larger than CIFAR-10 (32x32).
However, confidence results on Cifar-10 dataset is compar-
atively much higher than ImageNet. In each successful at-
tack the probability label of the target class(selected by the
attack) is the highest. Therefore, the average confidence on
ImageNet is relatively low but tell us that the other remain-
ing 999 classes are even lower such that the output becomes
an almost uniform soft label distribution. To sum it up, the
attack can break the confidence of AlexNet to a nearly uni-
form soft label distribution. The results indicate the large
images can be less vulnerable than mid-sized images.
The results of attacks are competitive with previous non-
targeted attack methods which need much more distortions
(Table 7).
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Variant Success Rate Confidence Cost
0.5/0.5/0.5 71.46% 89.38% 24.66
0.9/0.5/0.5 72.00% 88.22% 25.71
0.1/0.5/0.5 70.63% 90.86% 20.32
Table 4. Results of conducting the proposed attack on All Con-
volutional network(AllConv) with different F values. Among the
measures in the first row, the cost indicates the average distortion
in pixel values.
Variant Success Rate Confidence Cost
0.5/0.5/0.5 71.46% 89.38% 24.66
0.5/0.5/0.9 71.66% 88.60% 24.43
0.5/0.5/0.1 71.05% 89.71% 24.60
0.5/0.9/0.9 72.06% 90.19% 25.03
0.5/0.9/0.5 70.86% 89.58% 24.69
0.5/0.9/0.1 72.06% 88.70% 24.16
0.5/0.1/0.9 71.04% 88.98% 24.68
0.5/0.1/0.1 72.29% 88.68% 24.64
0.5/0.1/0.5 72.00% 88.98% 24.86
Table 5. Results of conducting the proposed attack on All Convo-
lutional network(AllConv) with different crossover strategies.
Variant Success Rate Confidence Cost
All Convolutional Net
0.1/0.1/0.1 71.86% 90.30% 20.44
0.5/0.1/0.1 72.29% 88.68% 24.64
Network In Network
0.1/0.1/0.1 77.64% 99.92% 14.76
0.5/0.1/0.1 78.24% 99.85% 18.99
VGG Network
0.1/0.1/0.1 56.49% 67.36% 22.98
0.5/0.1/0.1 61.28% 73.07% 24.62
BVLC Network
0.1/0.1/0.1 31.87% 14.88% 2.36
0.5/0.1/0.1 26.69% 14.79% 6.19
Table 6. Results of conducting proposed attacks on additional
datasets by using local-optimized DE 0.1/0.1/0.1 and 0.5/0.1/0.1.
4.2.2 Original-Target Class Pairs.
Since there is no term in the fitness function used to favor
the accuracy of a specific target class (i.e. non-targeted at-
tack), the evolved perturbation is expected to trend to move
the original images towards the most close target class such
that the results of original-target class pairs can be seen as
an indirect distance map between the original and different
target classes. For example, images of cat (class 3) is rela-
tively much close and can be more easily perturbed to dog
(class 5) through all types of networks and DE variants be-
ing tested.
Overall, it can be seen that some certain classes can be
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0.1/0.1/0.1 77.64% 99.92% 5(0.48%) NiN
0.1/0.1/0.1 56.49% 67.36% 5(0.48%) VGG
LSA[15] 97.89% 72% 33 (3.24%) NiN
LSA[15] 97.98% 77% 30 (2.99%) VGG
FGSM[11] 93.67% 93% 1024 (100%) NiN
FGSM[11] 90.93% 90% 1024 (100%) VGG
Table 7. Compassion of attack effectiveness between the proposed
method with DE 0.1/0.1/0.1 and two previous works, which shows
that even under more restricted condition, the proposed method
can still perform comparative effectiveness to previous works.
more easily perturbed to another close target class. Even if
the original and target class might be quite similar (e.g. cat
and dog) for both CNN and human eyes, in practice such
a vulnerability can be still fatal. In addition, the vulnera-
bility might be even regarded as a guideline for adversaries
to launch targeted attack. Saying that an adversary wishes
a natural image with true label Co can be mis-classified to
a specific target class Ct. According to the distance map
he(she) finds that directly perturbing Co to Ct is hard but it
is easy to perturb Co to a third class Cm which has much
less distance to Ct. Then an option is to first perturb Co
to Cm and then to the final destination Ct. For example,
according to the heat-map of All convolution network with
0.1/0.1/0.1 (the first graph of Figure. 4), an adversary can
perturb an image with label 0 to 9 by first perturbing the
image to class 8 then to class 9. Doing in such a way is
easier than directly perturbing from 0 to 9.
Additionally, it can also be seen that each heat-map
matrix is approximately symmetric, indicating that each
class has similar number of adversarial samples which were
crafted from these classes as well as to these classes, which
is also directly suggested by Figure 6. There are certain
classes that are apparently more vulnerable since being ex-
ploited more times than other classes, as the original and
target classes of attack. The existence of such vulnerable
classes can become a backdoor for inducing security prob-
lems.
4.2.3 Time complexity
The time complexity of DE can be evaluated according to
the number of evaluations which is a common metric in op-
timization. Specifically, the number of evaluations is equal
to the population size multiplied by the number of genera-
tions. In this research we set the maximum number of gen-
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Figure 5. Heat-maps of the number of times a successful attack
is present with the corresponding original-target class pair, on
three types of networks with attacks based on local-optimized DE
0.1/0.1/0.1. Red and blue indices indicate respectively the original
and target classes. The number from 0 to 9 indicates respectively
the following classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog,
frog, horse, ship, truck.
eration as 100 and population size as 400 therefore the max-
imum number of evaluations is 40000. We observed that
all DE variants reach the maximum number of evaluations
for each experiment on average. Even so, according to the
results mentioned above, the proposed attack can produce
effective solutions in such a small number of evaluations.
Figure 6. Heat-maps of the number of times a successful attack
is present with the corresponding original-target class pair, on
three types of networks with attacks based on local-optimized DE
0.5/0.1/0.1.
5. Discussion and Future Work
Our results show the influence of adjusting parameters
of DE to the effectiveness of attack. According to the com-
parison between different DE variants, it can be seen that
a small F value can induce little reduction on success rate
of attack but reduce about 26% distortion needed for con-
ducting the attack. In practice, adversaries can choose to
emphasize either success rate or distortion by adjusting the
F value. The crossovers between coordinates and RGB val-
ues of the perturbation are shown to be not useful for gen-
erating better quality perturbation. Such a phenomenon can
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Figure 7. Number of successful attacks (vertical axis) for a spe-
cific class acting as the original (blue) and target (red) class. The
horizontal axis indicates the index of each class which is the same
as Figure 5.
be easily realized by comparing the results between the DE
that disables both crossovers and others. This might indi-
cate that for a specific effective perturbation xi, its coordi-
nate and RGB value are strongly related. Transplanting ei-
ther the isolated vulnerable coordinate or RGB value of xi
to another perturbation can be no helpful, or even decrease
the quality of latter. Furthermore, the result might indicate
that for a specific natural image, universal vulnerable pixels
or RGB values can hardly exist in contrast to the exsitence
of the universal perturbation with respect to multiple im-
ages [8]. By vulnerable pixel we mean a specific pixel can
be vulnerable with multiple RGB values. And vulnerable
RGB value is a specific value that keeps its vulnerability
across different positions on an image. In other words, our
results shows that a success adversarial perturbation has to
be conducted at a specific locale on the image also with a
specific RGB value.
We show that DE can generate high quality solution of
perturbation by considering realistic constraints into the fit-
ness function. Specifically, the research evaluates the effec-
tiveness of using DEs for producing adversarial perturba-
tion under different parameter settings. In addition, the DEs
implemented are with low number of iterations and a rela-
tively small set of initial candidate solutions. Therefore, the
perturbation success rates should improve further by hav-
ing either more iterations or a bigger set of initial candidate
solutions.
The ultimate goal of proposing attack against the CNN
is evaluating its vulnerability. The CNN has been shown to
have different levels of vulnerabilities to additive perturba-
tion created from different types of optimization methods.
The proposed attacks shows that CNN is even vulnerable to
such a low cost, low dimensional imperceptible attack even
under extremely limited conditions. The future extension
can be done by analyzing and explaining why CNN is vul-
nerable to such various types of attacks simultaneously and
according extracting possible countermeasures.
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